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The War of Judicial Independence:  
Letters from the Kansas Front 
Richard E. Levy* 
LETTER 1: LAW LAW LAND 
Dear Readers: 
To many observers, ongoing efforts around the country to assert 
political control over the judiciary have some of the characteristics of 
war—including innocent civilian casualties.  Nationally, the battle to fill 
Justice Scalia’s seat on the United States Supreme Court was fierce.  
Here in Kansas, political efforts to control the courts, particularly the 
Kansas Supreme Court, garnered national attention.1 
Most recently, in the fall 2016 elections, conservative groups 
mounted a well-financed effort to unseat four Supreme Court justices 
(Lawton R. Nuss, Carol A. Beier, Dan Biles, and Marla J. Luckert).2  The 
results of the elections in the State of Kansas, however, ran somewhat 
                                                          
* J.B. Smith Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Kansas School of Law.  I 
thank the Law Review for the opportunity to publish this essay; Justine Koehle, class of 2017, for 
valuable research assistance; and Kevin Campbell and Lou Mulligan for helpful comments on earlier 
drafts.  As always, the views expressed in this essay are purely my own; I do not speak on behalf of 
the law school or the university. 
 1.   See Lincoln Caplan, The Political War Against the Kansas Supreme Court, NEW YORKER 
(Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-political-war-against-the-kansas-
supreme-court; John Eligon, Courts Budget Intensifies Kansas Dispute Over Powers, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/us/courts-budget-intensifies-kansas-dispute-
over-powers.html?_r=0; Joe Palazzolo, Kansas Lawmakers’ Budget Links Court Funding to Judicial 
Decision, WALL STREET J. (May 19, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/kansas-lawmakers-budget-
move-links-court-funding-to-court-decisions-1432067876.   
 2.   Governor Sam Brownback was one high-profile contributor to this effort.  See Bryan 
Lowry, Brownback’s PAC Gives Thousands to Group Seeking to Oust Justices, WICHITA EAGLE 
(Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/election/article111799967.html.  
Justice Stegall was also on the retention ballot, because this was the first election following his 
appointment.  Insofar as Justice Stegall was a Brownback appointee and presumed ally, the 
campaign against the other four justices exempted him. See, e.g., Steve Rose, Attempt to Oust 
Kansas Supreme Court Judges Is Likely Doomed, KAN. CITY STAR (June 18, 2016), 
http://www.kansascity.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/steve-rose/article84456322.html (“The 
single Brownback appointee, Caleb Stegall, who is up for retention, will somehow be differentiated 
from the others during the ouster campaign”).  The impact of the campaign can be assessed by 
comparing the results for the four targeted justices with the results for Justice Stegall.  See infra 
notes 61–62 and accompanying text.  
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counter to national trends.  To be sure, the state remained reliably “red,” 
in the sense that Republican candidates swept the presidential and 
congressional vote, and retained control of statewide offices and both the 
Kansas House of Representatives and Kansas Senate.3  On balance, 
however, the Kansas government became somewhat less “conservative.”4  
A number of the most conservative members of the state legislature were 
unseated in the primaries or in the general election.5  Critically for 
purposes of this essay, moreover, the four justices targeted by 
conservatives won their retention elections.6 
These results may provide a temporary respite from the escalating 
tensions between the political branches and the judiciary.  On the 
legislative side, there are fewer strident voices attacking the courts or 
advocating for retaliatory legislation.  Conversely, the Kansas Supreme 
Court is less vulnerable politically.  The failure of efforts to unseat the 
four targeted justices has afforded them a certain measure of job security 
and suggests that future efforts along similar lines are unlikely to 
succeed.  Nonetheless, tensions are almost certain to flair anew in light of 
the Kansas Supreme Court’s most recent ruling in the adequacy portion 
of ongoing school finance litigation.7 
I am grateful to the editors of The University of Kansas Law Review 
for affording me the opportunity to address these developments.  The 
form of my contribution—as a series of letters to readers—is meant both 
to evoke a proud tradition of using public letters to address important 
issues of the day and to afford the opportunity to discuss these matters in 
                                                          
 3.   See generally 2016 General Election Official Vote Totals, KAN. SECRETARY ST., 
https://www.sos.ks.gov/elections/16elec/2016_General_Election_Official_Results.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2017) [hereinafter 2016 General Election Results]. 
 4.   I have placed the term “conservative” in quotation marks because the term seems to mean 
different things to different people.  See,¸e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, What Americans Mean when They 
Say They’re Conservative, ATLANTIC (Jan. 27, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/01/what-americans-mean-when-they-say-theyre-
conservative/252099/. In contemporary political parlance, it generally refers to a political ideology 
characterized by social policies that reflect traditional moral values on matters of sexuality, 
marriage, and abortion (often grounded in fundamentalist religious views), and economic policies 
that oppose regulation, taxation, and government benefit programs.  See id.  Notwithstanding this 
general understanding of what it means to be politically conservative, there are many disagreements 
among conservatives and within the Republican Party on particular issues—just as there are 
disagreements among progressives/liberals and within the Democratic Party.  See id. 
 5.   Tim Carpenter, Election Shifts Legislature to Center-Right on Political Dial, TOPEKA 
CAP.-J. (Nov. 8, 2016), http://cjonline.com/news/2016-11-08/election-shifts-legislature-center-right-
political-dial. 
 6.   2016 General Election Results, supra note 3, at 12. 
 7.   Gannon v. State (Gannon IV), No. 113,267, 2017 WL 833551, at *41–42 (Kan. Mar. 2, 
2017) (upholding lower court finding that funding levels were constitutionally inadequate and giving 
the legislature until June 30, 2017, to adopt a new formula that cures the constitutional deficiencies). 
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a more personal voice.8  Insofar as I am writing from a personal 
perspective, it is best for me to be up front about my biases in these 
matters: I am in favor of judicial independence.  I am in favor of judicial 
independence because I am in favor of the rule of law, and I believe that 
judicial independence is essential to preserving the rule of law.  Indeed, 
the most important thing I have to say is that judicial independence is 
worth fighting for even if—and perhaps especially when—we disagree 
with the courts’ decisions. 
As I have explained elsewhere,9 the rule of law is the essential 
foundation of a free and prosperous society.  In this context, what I mean 
by the rule of law is that the state operates pursuant to generally 
applicable and legally binding rules enacted or adopted through 
constitutionally prescribed processes that afford them legitimacy.10  This 
means that when the government acts, it must have the legal authority to 
do so, and that the law operates as a limit on the actions of government 
officials.  History has shown that the rule of law is critical to a system of 
“ordered liberty” and to the well-being of society.  Without the rule of 
law, individual liberties are not secure, markets cannot function, and 
concentrated power is unconstrained.  People who live in countries that 
have the rule of law enjoy greater security, prosperity, and liberty.11 
In our system, the judiciary determines whether the government has 
complied with the rule of law and thereby ensures the proper functioning 
of the constitutional order.12  Under separation-of-powers principles, the 
legislature makes the laws, the executive implements the laws, and the 
courts interpret the laws.  This account, to be sure, oversimplifies the 
separation of powers, because the lines between making, enforcing, and 
interpreting the laws are far from clear and because the proper balance of 
authority and responsibility in particular contexts presents a variety of 
                                                          
 8.   For constitutional scholars like me, the prime example of this format is the Federalist 
Papers.  See The Federalist Papers, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers (last visited Apr. 1, 
2017).  Unlike the authors of the Federalist Papers, however, I shall not use a pseudonym. 
 9.   See Richard E. Levy, The Tie That Binds: Some Thoughts About the Rule of Law, Law and 
Economics, Collective Action Theory, Reciprocity, and Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, 56 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 901, 902–03 (2008). 
 10.   The rule of law also imposes a corresponding duty on the part of citizens to accept the 
legitimacy of and comply with these “generally applicable and legally binding rules” even when they 
disagree with the law. 
 11.   See generally Francis Fukuyama, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER: FROM PREHUMAN 
TIMES TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, (Reprint Ed. 2012) (discussing the essential conditions for a 
stable state, including the rule of law). 
 12.   See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176–80 (1803).  Chief Justice John Marshall 
famously proclaimed in Marbury v. Madison, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”  Id. at 177. 
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complex issues.  Nonetheless, within this constitutional structure, the 
courts’ critical role is to act as independent arbiters of the law, both as a 
means of fairly resolving legal disputes and of providing an authoritative 
determination of “what the law is.”13 
Insofar as the courts are entirely dependent upon the other branches 
of government for their operation and lack the ability to implement their 
own orders, their power depends on public acceptance that their 
decisions represent an authoritative determination of the law.14  If courts 
become little more than instruments of political power, then they lose 
their legitimacy and can no longer serve their critical functions.  
Accepting judicial independence and the legitimacy of decisions with 
which we disagree, however profoundly, is a small price to pay for the 
benefits of the rule of law. 
LETTER 2: A SERIES OF ESCALATING EVENTS 
Dear Readers: 
It is not always easy to pinpoint exactly when a war begins—some 
wars are triggered by dramatic events or sudden attacks, but others build 
over time, from occasional and isolated skirmishes that gradually 
escalate into open warfare.  It is in the nature of separation of powers that 
there will be tensions between the political branches and the judiciary, 
especially when the judiciary exercises the power to invalidate the 
actions of the legislative and executive branches.15  It is also only natural 
for political actors to want control over the power that the judiciary 
wields.16  So we may expect judicial independence to be a contentious 
issue and for there to be occasional conflict.  These inherent tensions 
become cause for concern, however, when political actors seek to 
                                                          
 13.   Id. 
 14.   A striking example of this phenomenon was Vice President Al Gore’s acceptance of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore.  531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000); Al Gore, Vice President, 
Presidential Concession Speech (Dec. 13, 2000), 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/algore2000concessionspeech.html. 
 15.   President Andrew Jackson is reputed to have responded to the Supreme Court decision in 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him 
enforce it.”  Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court History: The First Hundred Years, PBS (2006) 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/antebellum/history2.html.  Whether Jackson actually said it 
is now a matter of considerable doubt.  Id. 
 16.   See 1937: Roosevelt Announces “Court-Packing” Plan, HISTORY, 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/roosevelt-announces-court-packing-plan (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2017).  So, for example, Franklin Delano Roosevelt famously responded to Supreme Court 
decisions invalidating key “New Deal” legislation by proposing the so-called “court-packing” plan, 
which would have allowed him to appoint six new Justices to the Supreme Court.  Id.   
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subordinate the judiciary, strip the courts of their jurisdiction and powers, 
or defy judicial orders, thereby threatening judicial independence and the 
rule of law.17 
Over the last dozen or so years, conflict between the judiciary and 
political branches in Kansas intensified as the result of a series of actions 
and reactions, set against the backdrop of economic turmoil and partisan 
political polarization.  To provide context for the discussion in the letters 
that follow, I offer the following overview of key developments, 
presented conceptually and in roughly chronological order: 
 School Finance Litigation (Montoy): Although there were 
certainly conflicts between politicians and the judiciary 
before then, the origins of the current conflict in Kansas can 
be traced to the Montoy school finance litigation.18  In that 
case, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the legislature 
had failed to fulfill its constitutional duty under Article VI of 
the Kansas Constitution to provide suitable funding for 
public education, and declared that the legislature must 
provide roughly $850 million in additional funding to satisfy 
this duty.19  Because the court’s rulings required additional 
expenditures, many legislators regarded them as a usurpation 
of the legislature’s exclusive power of appropriation.20  A 
contentious special legislative session followed, in which 
                                                          
 17.   This is not to say, however, that political disregard for judicial independence or the rule of 
law is necessarily or entirely to blame for escalating tensions.  Judicial overreach, particularly on 
highly contentious matters, may invite political retaliation.  Thus, whether it is the political branches 
or the judiciary that starts the war for judicial independence may be entirely in the eye of the 
beholder.  
 18.   See generally Montoy v. State (Montoy IV), 138 P.3d 755 (Kan. 2006) (concluding that 
additional funding promised by the legislature satisfied the court’s prior orders and dismissing the 
case); Montoy v. State (Montoy III), 112 P.3d 923 (Kan. 2005) (concluding that legislative response 
to prior decision failed to cure constitutionally inadequate funding levels); Montoy v. State (Montoy 
II), 102 P.3d 1160 (Kan. 2005) (per curiam), withdrawn and republished with concurring opinion, 
120 P.3d 306 (Kan. 2005) (upholding lower court’s findings that legislature failed to fulfill its 
constitutional duty to provide suitable funding for schools); Montoy v. State (Montoy I), 62 P.3d 228 
(Kan. 2003) (reversing lower court’s dismissal of the case and remanding for trial on the merits).  I 
have previously offered a detailed analysis of the Montoy litigation.  Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at 
the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1040–106 (2006) [hereinafter Gunfight at the K-12 Corral].  I will not repeat the 
details here.  
 19.   See Montoy III, 112 P.3d at 940–41 (stating that the legislature must provide additional 
funding of $285 million for the coming year, $142 million of which was already provided in 
previously adopted legislation, and the remaining $585 million in the following year). 
 20.   Bryan Lowry, Gov. Sam Brownback’s Push to Change Kansas Supreme Court Seen as 
Linked to School Finance, KAN. CITY STAR (Jan. 24, 2015), 
http://www.kansascity.com/news/article8071974.html#!.  See KAN. CONST. art. 2, § 24 (“No money 
shall be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of a specific appropriation made by law.”). 
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there was talk of defiance and consideration of constitutional 
amendments to deprive the court of power.  In the end, the 
legislature grudgingly—under threat of a judicial order 
closing the schools—promised sufficient funding to satisfy 
the court.21  Although constitutional amendments to curtail 
the courts’ powers failed, the legislature did adopt some 
statutory changes, including provisions purporting to deny 
the courts’ authority to enjoin funding and thereby close the 
schools.22  More broadly, the confrontation left many in the 
legislature resentful of the court, and created fertile ground 
for subsequent measures targeting the courts. 
 Intervening Events: Although the resolution of the Montoy 
litigation eased tensions between the judiciary and political 
branches somewhat, intervening events set the stage for a 
renewal of the conflict.  First, the “great recession” of 2008 
led to economic turmoil and a dramatic downturn in the 
State’s tax revenues.  In the face of a budget crisis, the 
legislature did not appropriate the funding promised in 
Montoy.23  Second, the elections of 2010 and 2012 saw 
substantial gains by the most conservative elements of the 
state’s Republican Party, which captured many statewide 
offices, including the governorship.24  In the legislature, the 
traditional balance between the moderate and conservative 
wing of the Republican Party shifted sharply in favor of the 
conservative wing, especially after moderates who opposed 
                                                          
 21.   The legislature passed and the governor signed S.B. 3 during the summer 2005 special 
session, which was followed by the adoption of S.B. 549 in the 2006 regular session.  See Gunfight 
at the K-12 Corral, supra note 18, at 1046–47 (discussing S.B. 3 and S.B. 549).  These bills 
promised additional appropriations for schools that were sufficient to satisfy the Kansas Supreme 
Court, which dismissed the case.  Montoy IV, 138 P.3d at 762, 765–66.  For further detail, see 
Gunfight at the K-12 Corral, supra note 18, at 1046–47. 
 22.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-64b03 (Supp. 2016) (providing for the creation of a special 
three-judge court and specifying that the court “shall not have the authority to order a school district 
or any attendance center within a school district to be closed or enjoin the use of all statutes related 
to the distribution of funds for public education”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2106(d) (Supp. 2016) 
(specifying that appellate courts “shall not have the authority to order a school district or any 
attendance center within a school district to be closed or enjoin the use of all statutes related to the 
distribution of funds for public education”).  For further discussion of these provisions, see infra 
notes 81–94 and accompanying text. 
 23.   See, e.g., Gannon v. State, No. 10C1569, 2013 WL 146092, at *27 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Jan. 10, 
2013) (discussing the Legislature’s failure to provide funding promised in Montoy litigation as 
relevant background to the case before the court). 
 24.   Election Statistics, KAN. SECRETARY ST., 
http://www.kssos.org/elections/elections_statistics.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (providing links to 
download the results for the 2010 and 2012 statewide elections). 
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the conservative agenda were “primaried out” in 2012.25  A 
central feature of this shift was the enactment of substantial 
tax cuts, which were the centerpiece of the Governor’s 
economic agenda.  Conservatives in the legislature seemed 
eager to challenge the judiciary, adopting various statutes 
that defied settled constitutional doctrine.26  The legislature 
also ignored previous legislative promises to provide 
additional funding for schools, eventually precipitating a 
new round of school finance litigation.27 
                                                          
 25.   These events are aptly summarized by Joseph A. Aistrup as follows: 
In the second year, the centerpiece of Brownback’s agenda became a plan to phase out 
the state’s income tax.  Over the objections of the President of the Kansas Senate, 
Republican Steve Morris, Brownback’s Republican allies passed the largest tax cut in the 
state’s history, including completely eliminating the state income tax for privately held 
companies.  Morris could not support creating a cumulative $2 billion hole in the state’s 
budget by 2017.  The combination of this issue and a redistricting battle set into motion 
an open feud between the governor and the senate president, which ended in a GOP 
primary battle between moderate incumbent senators and supporters of Morris versus 
Brownback and Kansas Chamber of Commerce-backed challengers to these incumbents.  
On a hot August 2012 primary election day, 15 of 21 senate moderates lost, including 
President Morris. 
Joseph A. Aistrup, Kansas Elections: Then and Now, 25 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 302 (2016) 
(footnotes and citations omitted). 
 26.   See, e.g., Kansas Second Amendment Protection Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1201 
through 50-1211 (Supp. 2016).  This statute purports to insulate firearms that were made and sold in 
the state (and did not move in interstate commerce) from federal regulation.  See id.  Such a statute is 
clearly contrary to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, Section 2, 
insofar as federal power over interstate commerce includes the power to regulate local economic 
activities if their aggregate effects on interstate commerce are substantial.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1, 17–33 (2005) (upholding federal power to regulate cultivation of marijuana for personal 
consumption).  Thus, it is not surprising that the act did not prevent prosecution for violation of 
federal gun laws.  See Order Denying Motion, United States v. Cox, No. 15-10150-01,02-JTM, 2017 
WL 411358, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 2017) (“[T]he Constitution could not be clearer on one point: if 
the National Firearms Act is a valid exercise of Congressional taxing power, and if it does not 
infringe on rights granted in the U.S. Constitution, then it is the ‘supreme Law of the Land,’ 
regardless of what [the Second Amendment Protection Act] says.”). 
 27.   This litigation, which is still pending, has produced a number of published decisions by the 
Kansas Supreme Court as well as two lengthy opinions by the three-judge panel hearing the case at 
the trial level.  See generally Gannon v. State (Gannon IV), No. 113,267, 2017 WL 833551 (Kan. 
Mar. 2, 2017) (upholding lower court finding that funding levels were constitutionally inadequate); 
Gannon v. State (Gannon III), 372 P.3d 1181 (Kan. 2016) (concluding that legislative response had 
not fully cured inequitable funding in violation of the Kansas Constitution); Gannon v. State 
(Gannon II), 368 P.3d 1024 (Kan. 2016) (concluding that the state had failed to cure equity 
deficiencies identified in prior phases of the litigation); Gannon v. State (Gannon I), 319 P.3d 1196 
(Kan. 2014) (affirming lower court’s finding of inequitable funding but remanding the adequacy 
challenge because the lower court had not applied the proper standards for determining adequacy); 
Gannon v. State, No. 2010CV1569, SHAWNEE CT. (Kan. Dist. Ct. June 26, 2015), 
http://www.shawneecourt.org/DocumentCenter/View/532 (concluding that the state was no longer in 
substantial compliance with equity rulings after it failed to implement promised equalization aid); 
Gannon v. State, No. 2010CV1569, SHAWNEE CT. (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 2014), 
http://www.shawneecourt.org/DocumentCenter/View/527 (reaffirming prior finding that the state 
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 Legislative Actions Targeting the Judiciary: With the 
legislature and governor’s office fully controlled by staunch 
conservatives, various initiatives targeting the courts were 
introduced, with varying degrees of success.28  One point of 
emphasis for conservatives was changing the means of 
judicial selection from the use of nominating commissions, 
so as to give the Governor and his allies in the Senate the 
ability to pick conservative judges.29  With respect to the 
courts of appeal, this sort of change was accomplished by 
statute in 2013,30 but changing the means of selecting Kansas 
Supreme Court justices would require a constitutional 
amendment, and the proponents of this change were unable 
                                                          
provided inadequate funding after applying correct standards on remand); Gannon v. State, No. 
10C1569, 2013 WL 146092 (Kan. Dist. Ct. 2013) (original lower court decision finding that school 
finance was constitutionally deficient because it was inadequate and inequitable); see also Gannon v. 
State, 357 P.3d 873, 874 (Kan. 2015) (affirming three-judge panel’s denial of school district’s 
motion to intervene).  For further discussion of Gannon and its implications, see infra notes 36–38, 
82–101, and 113–28 and accompanying text. 
 28.   In addition to the actions discussed in the following text, numerous other measures, 
including constitutional amendments limiting judicial power, were introduced but did not pass.  In 
the 2016 session, for example, S.B. 439 purported to define impeachable offenses that would allow 
the removal of judges to include “attempting to usurp the power of the legislative or executive 
branch of government.” S.B. 439, 2016 Leg. Sess. § 1(h) (Kan. 2016) (as amended by the Senate 
Committee of the Whole), 
http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2016/b2015_16/measures/documents/sb439_02_0000.pdf.  The bill 
died in the House Judiciary Committee, however.  See S.B. 439, 2016 Leg. Sess. (Kan. 2016), 
http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2016/b2015_16/measures/sb439/.  For further discussion of S.B. 
439, see infra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.  Another example, from the 2014 session, was 
S.B. 364.  That bill would have stripped the Supreme Court of its power to allocate annual budgets 
for each of the thirty-one judicial districts, instead granting each judicial district the power to 
allocate its own budget.  S.B. 364, 2014 Leg. Sess. (Kan. 2014) (as amended by Senate Committee), 
http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/measures/documents/sb364_01_0000.pdf.  This bill, 
if passed, would probably be unconstitutional. See KAN. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The supreme court 
shall have general administrative authority over all courts in this state.”).  The bill died when it was 
stricken from the legislative calendar.  See S.B. 364, 2015 Leg. Sess. (Kan. 2014), 
http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/measures/sb364/.  Although there were others, these 
examples should be sufficient to illustrate the general point. 
 29.   See Daniel Salazar, Kansas Judicial Selection Measure Falls Short of Votes, WICHITA 
EAGLE (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article58192398.html.  
There are principled arguments to support this change and many advocates may have principled 
reasons for supporting it.  See infra notes 63–80 and accompanying text (discussing debate over 
judicial selection methods).  Nonetheless, it is reasonable to attribute political motives to politicians, 
especially when—given the context—the result of the change would so clearly further their political 
interests by giving them control over the judiciary. 
 30.   Under the previous model, often referred to as merit selection, the governor would make 
an appointment from a list of three candidates selected by a nominating commission. See Caplan, 
supra note 1.  The new statute followed the federal model, providing for the governor to nominate 
his or her preferred candidate, subject to Senate confirmation. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3020 
(Supp. 2016). 
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to garner the necessary supermajority to present an 
amendment to the voters.31  In 2014, the legislature adopted 
two other statutes targeting the judiciary.  The more high-
profile statute stripped the Kansas Supreme Court’s authority 
to appoint the chief judge of each district, providing instead 
for the election of the chief judge by the judges of the 
district.32  Perhaps in anticipation of a challenge to this 
provision, which was included in the appropriations bill for 
the judiciary, the legislature included a non-severability 
clause (and added a similar provision to the following year’s 
appropriations bill), specifying that if any provision of the 
law were to be invalidated, the entire law was invalid.33  This 
maneuver was widely perceived as an effort to blackmail the 
courts by threatening to cut off funding if the courts 
invalidated the law.34  Another, less well known provision 
adopted at roughly the same time set a deadline for deciding 
cases on appeal.35 
 Controversial Judicial Decisions or Other Actions: For its 
part, the judiciary did not hesitate to render decisions or take 
other actions likely to provoke strong reactions from 
                                                          
 31.   See Salazar, supra note 29.  The use of merit selection for Supreme Court justices is 
mandated by Article 3, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, which was adopted in 1958 in response to the 
so-called “triple play” of 1956–57, through which outgoing Governor Fred Hall became chief justice 
of the Kansas Supreme Court. See Kan. Historical Soc’y, Political “Triple Play” Resignations and 
Oaths of Office, KAN. MEMORY, http://www.kansasmemory.org/item/228731 (last visited Apr. 1, 
2017).  Hall had lost in a primary to Warren Shaw, who lost the general election to George Docking.  
The triple play worked as follows.  Id.  First, Governor Hall’s longtime friend, Chief Justice Joseph 
Smith, resigned on December 31, 1956, shortly before the end of Hall’s term.  Id.  Second, Hall 
resigned as governor on January 3, 1957, allowing his lieutenant governor, John McCuish, to assume 
office.  Id.  Third, that same day in his sole official act, Governor McCuish appointed Hall to be 
chief justice of the Kansas Supreme Court.  Id. 
 32.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-329 (Supp. 2016), invalidated by Solomon v. State, 364 P.3d 
536 (Kan. 2015).   
 33.   H.B. 2338, 2014 Reg. Sess. § 43 (Kan. 2014), 
http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/measures/documents/hb2338_enrolled.pdf 
(severability clause in original appropriations bill).  See also H.B. 2005, 2015 Reg. Sess. § 29 (Kan. 
2015), http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2016/b2015_16/measures/documents/hb2005_enrolled.pdf 
(specifying that provisions of 2015 appropriations bill were not severable from provisions of 2014 
appropriations bill). 
 34.   It was this measure, in particular, that attracted the attention of the national media, and 
gave me the opportunity, as a local professor of constitutional law, to be quoted by the New York 
Times and the Wall Street Journal.  See supra note 1.  I remember disappointing one reporter by my 
refusal to use the term “blackmail” in characterizing the law, although I did express my concern that 
this sort of linkage threatens judicial independence.  See infra notes 95–106 and accompanying text 
(discussing implications of the non-severability clause for judicial independence).  
 35.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3301 (Supp. 2016). 
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conservative politicians.  Thus, when the failure to provide 
promised funding for schools precipitated a new round of 
school finance litigation, the Kansas Supreme Court 
emphatically rejected the state’s argument that such issues 
were non-justiciable political questions.36  Nonetheless, the 
Court did delay the day of reckoning on the adequacy of 
funding by remanding on the issue.37  Likewise, the Kansas 
Supreme Court was not intimidated by statutes targeting the 
courts; it invalidated both the statute removing its power to 
appoint chief judges and the statute imposing deadlines for 
issuing appellate decisions.38  More broadly, the courts did 
not shy away from other controversial decisions, including 
decisions setting aside the death penalty in the infamous Carr 
brothers case39 and an en banc decision by the court of 
appeals in which the judges were evenly split on the 
recognition of the right to abortion under the Kansas 
Constitution.40  On the other hand, Kansas courts were able, 
for the most part, to stay out of the fray with respect to same-
sex marriage and the constitutionality of the Kansas 
Marriage Amendment, leaving such issues to the federal 
courts.41 
                                                          
 36.   Gannon v. State (Gannon I), 319 P.3d 1196, 1216–23, 1251 (Kan. 2014). 
 37.   Id. at 1237–38 (remanding adequacy question to lower court for reconsideration under 
newly announced standard for determining adequacy).  After remand, the trial court reaffirmed its 
finding that funding was constitutionally inadequate.  Gannon v. State, No. 2010CV1569, SHAWNEE 
CT. (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.shawneecourt.org/DocumentCenter/View/527.  The 
Kansas Supreme Court recently affirmed that finding.  Gannon v. State (Gannon IV), No. 113,267, 
2017 WL 833551 (Kan. Mar. 2, 2017).  For further discussion of the implications of Gannon IV, see 
infra notes 116–129 and accompanying text. 
 38.   See Solomon v. State, 364 P.3d 536, 549–50 (Kan. 2015) (holding that statute providing 
for local judges in each district to elect their chief judge improperly infringed on the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s responsibility for the administration of the courts); see also State v. Buser, 302 
Kan. 1, 12–14, 2015 WL 4646663, at *9–10 (2015) (holding that remedies for delay in rendering 
appellate decisions improperly encroached on judicial power). 
 39.   State v. Carr, 331 P.3d 544 (Kan 2014); State v. Carr, 329 P.3d 1195 (Kan. 2014).  The 
United States Supreme Court later reversed the Kansas Supreme Court in these cases, as well as 
another decision setting aside a death penalty sentence on similar grounds.  Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. 
Ct. 633, 643–44, 646 (2016). 
 40.   Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 368 P.3d 667, 678–79 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (en 
banc), review granted (Apr. 11, 2016). 
 41.   Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s definitive resolution of this issue in Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), one chief district judge issued an order directing personnel in the 
district to grant licenses to same-sex couples, concluding that lower court decisions on the issue were 
sufficiently authoritative to require this step.  See Tony Rizzo & Glenn E. Rice, Same-Sex Couples 
Now Can Legally Marry in Johnson County, KAN. CITY STAR (Oct. 8, 2014), 
http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article2625194.html.  But the Attorney 
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As this overview of events suggests, in the run up to the November 
2016 elections, tensions between the political branches and the judiciary 
were running high.  These tensions had both institutional and ideological 
dimensions.  Institutionally, there is a natural friction between the 
judiciary and the political branches, insofar as the judiciary’s institutional 
power and responsibility includes the invalidation of unconstitutional and 
unlawful actions by the political branches.  Such decisions never sit well 
with the legislature and Governor, who often perceive them as 
overreaching by the judiciary.  This sort of institutional friction has been 
especially acute with respect to school finance.  But when this natural 
institutional friction was exacerbated by sharp ideological differences 
and the courts loomed as the only substantial obstacle to the 
implementation of a conservative political agenda, the conflict became 
acute.  It is hardly surprising, then, that conservative forces would target 
four “liberal” Kansas Supreme Court justices (Beier, Biles, Luckert, and 
Nuss) whose retention was on the ballot.42 
LETTER THREE: GOOD JUDGE HUNTING 
Dear Readers: 
When we talk about the independence of the judiciary, we mean first 
and foremost that the judiciary is not part of or answerable to the 
legislative or executive branches (or any other superior authority).43  This 
                                                          
General filed a mandamus action and the Kansas Supreme Court issued a stay.  See State ex rel. 
Schmidt v. Moriarty, No. 112,590 (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-
government/article4013159.ece/binary/Kansas%20Supreme%20Court%20order.pdf.   
 42.   I use the term “liberal” advisedly here.  Like the term “conservative,” the term “liberal” 
means different things to different people.  Likewise, both are relative terms.  Thus, I would not 
characterize the Kansas Supreme Court as especially “liberal,” at least not on all issues and not by 
comparison to the highest courts of other states.  Nonetheless, the Kansas Supreme Court is clearly 
liberal by comparison to the Governor or the conservative wing of the legislature.  See supra notes 
18–41 and accompanying text (discussing conflicts between the political branches and the Kansas 
courts). 
 43.   See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219–25 (1995) (discussing the historical 
background of judicial independence in the United States).  Note that this sort of independence may 
be more a matter of practical control than formal status.  Thus, for example, the French Conseil 
d’Etat is part of the executive branch.  See C.J. HAMSON, EXECUTIVE DISCRETION AND JUDICIAL 
CONTROL: AN ASPECT OF THE FRENCH CONSEIL D’ETAT 45–46 (1954).  The situation is even more 
complicated in the United Kingdom, where the ordinary courts originated as an arm of the crown 
and continue to be administered by the Ministry of Justice, which are part of her Majesty’s 
Government.  See The Justice System and the Constitution, CTS. & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-the-government-and-the-
constitution/jud-acc-ind/justice-sys-and-constitution/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).  Until recently, the 
House of Lords, a component of Parliament, also served in a judicial capacity as the final court of 
appeals.  Glenn Dymond, Library Note: The Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords 11 (Nov. 
20, 2009), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-library/lln2009-010appellate.pdf.  
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sort of functional independence is necessary both as a matter of 
fundamental fairness in individual cases and to ensure that the courts can 
serve their role in holding government actors accountable to the rule of 
law.44  In individual cases, a lack of judicial independence creates the 
very real risk that external pressures will compromise judicial 
impartiality to a degree that is incompatible with due process of law.45  
Equally important, judges who are controlled by the legislative or 
executive branches cannot be expected to zealously enforce 
constitutional and other legal limits on government action.46 
Accordingly, both federal and state courts in the United States are 
structurally independent from the legislative and executive branches, 
which have no authority to oversee judicial decisions, either by directing 
outcomes or by reviewing and altering a decision.47  Structural 
                                                          
Notwithstanding the lack of formal structural independence of these judicial bodies in France and the 
United Kingdom, they enjoy sufficient functional independence to serve their roles in preserving the 
rule of law. See generally Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional 
Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307 (2001) (discussing German, French, and Anglo-American rule 
of law traditions). 
 44.   In so doing, the courts also hold the people accountable to the dictates of the constitution 
as well.  Thus, for example, in cases like Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(requiring desegregation of the schools), and more recently Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015) (requiring states to allow same-sex couples to marry), the Court’s decisions were directed at 
the states’ political institutions, but those changes implicated widely held and deeply felt social 
attitudes.  In such cases, respect for the rule of law is especially important.  
 45.   See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873–76, 884–87 (2009) 
(holding that failure of a West Virginia Supreme Court justice to recuse himself from case in which 
one of the litigants had contributed millions of dollars in campaign spending on his behalf violated 
due process).  
 46.   The recent litigation concerning President Trump’s executive orders imposing a travel ban 
on certain immigrants illustrates this point.  See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1168–69 (9th 
Cir. Feb. 9, 2017) (refusing to stay lower court order enjoining of initial executive order); Hawai’i v. 
Trump, CV No. 17–00050 DKW–KSC, 2017 WL 1167383, at *9 (D. Haw. 2017) (enjoining revised 
executive order); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, CV No. TDC–17–0361, 2017 WL 
1018235, at *18 (D. Md. 2017).  See also Ali v. Trump, No. C17–0135JLR, 
2017 WL 1057645, at *5–6 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (staying action on motion for temporary restraining 
order against revised executive order so long as a nationwide order or injunction was in place); 
Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 1050354, at *5–6 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (same).  
Contra Sarsour v. Trump, No. 1:17cv00120, 2017 WL 1113305, at *15–16 (E.D. Va. 2017) 
(refusing to issue temporary restraining order against revised executive order).  This sort of decision 
would be far less likely if courts had to fear retaliation from the President and Congress.  To be sure, 
those who favor the executive order might argue that the court was wrong and is guilty of 
overreaching, but those same people would likely applaud the federal court order enjoining President 
Obama’s executive action deferring removal for certain classes of undocumented aliens.  See Texas 
v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 186–88 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an evenly divided court, 136 S. Ct. 
2271 (2016).  In this sense, judicial independence is neither inherently conservative nor inherently 
liberal, but rather depends on the juxtaposition of the court and the political branches.  
 47.   To be sure, the political branches can reverse or alter the law made by judicial decisions; 
that is, they can overturn common law or statutory decisions by passing new laws and overturn 
constitutional decisions by amending the constitution.  These steps, however, do not threaten the 
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independence standing alone, however, is not sufficient to secure judicial 
independence; judges also need protection from improper forms of 
political retaliation.  Recognizing that the fear of punishment might 
affect judicial decisions, the framers of the United States Constitution 
insulated the judiciary from such threats by providing for life tenure and 
prohibiting any reduction in their salaries.48 
The Kansas Constitution provides similar protections, but these 
protections are less absolute than in the federal system.49  First, like the 
federal Constitution, the Kansas Constitution prohibits the reduction of 
judicial salaries, but this prohibition is subject to an exception that 
permits such a reduction by means of a general law applicable to all state 
officials.50  Second, the Kansas Constitution provides for removal by 
impeachment, but it also permits the forced retirement of judges (after a 
hearing) if they become so incapacitated that they can no longer 
adequately perform their duties.51  Although neither of these 
qualifications is a significant departure from the federal model, the 
Kansas Constitution also requires Supreme Court justices to stand for 
retention elections, which has more serious implications for judicial 
independence.52 
                                                          
independence of the judiciary because they do not punish the judges who make the decision or alter 
the outcome of particular cases.  See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227–30 (holding that a statute reversing the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute of limitations for certain civil actions applied in 
pending cases but could not reopen final decisions dismissing cases).  In contrast, for example, the 
leaders of executive agencies can ordinarily tell their subordinates what to do and overrule actions 
with which they disagree.  Of course, this power may require the threat of removal from office or of 
other sanctions to be effective.  
 48.   U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”). 
 49.   Somewhat different rules and provisions apply to supreme court justices, appellate judges, 
and trial judges. Compare KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 5 (“Selection of justices of the supreme court”), 
KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 6 (“District Courts”), and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-2901 (2007) (“Proposition of 
method of selection of judges of district court; submission of proposition on filing of petition or in 
newly established district”), with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3020 (Supp. 2016) (“Judges; appointment 
by governor; consent of senate; time limitations; commencement of judges’ duties; qualifications”).  
I will focus here primarily on the Kansas Supreme Court, because it is the highest court in the state 
and its independence is therefore the most critical.  
 50.   KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 13 (“The justices of the supreme court and judges of the district 
courts shall receive for their services such compensation as may be provided by law, which shall not 
be diminished during their terms of office, unless by general law applicable to all salaried officers of 
the state.”). 
 51.   KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 15 (providing for removal by impeachment and for retirement of 
judges based on incapacity); see also KAN. CONST. art. 2, §§ 27–28 (specifying procedures and 
grounds for impeachment and removal).  In addition, the Kansas Supreme Court can discipline, 
suspend, or remove lower court judges for good cause.  KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 15. 
 52.   See KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 5(c) (providing that Supreme Court justices must stand for 
retention in the first regular election following their appointment and every six years after that); 
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Given their unhappiness with the composition of the Supreme Court, 
it is not surprising that some conservatives would seek to remove some 
justices from the court.  One approach worth noting is S.B. 439, a bill 
considered in the 2016 legislative session that would have defined the 
grounds for impeachment of judges broadly.53  Among other things, the 
bill would have allowed the removal of justices for “failure to perform 
adequately the duties of office,” “attempting to subvert fundamental laws 
and introduce arbitrary power,” “attempting to usurp the power of the 
legislative or executive branch,” “exhibiting discourteous conduct” in 
their official capacity, or “exhibiting wanton or reckless judicial 
conduct.”54 
In my view, S.B. 439 would be a severe threat to judicial 
independence and almost certainly would be unconstitutional.  The 
Kansas Constitution (like its federal counterpart) permits impeachment 
for and removal upon conviction of “treason, bribery, or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors.”55  There is no plausible interpretation of this 
phrase that would include some of the grounds listed in the bill, such as 
“exhibiting discourteous conduct.”56  That such a bill would pass the 
Senate, even if it died in House Committee, is a testament to the level of 
legislative frustration with the courts.57 
Of course, the more direct strategy for reshaping the Supreme Court 
was the effort to unseat four justices in the 2016 elections.  This effort, 
which is clearly permissible under the Kansas Constitution, highlights 
one critical concern with retention elections—they may compromise 
judicial independence.  To be sure, retention elections are less of a threat 
to judicial independence than giving the political branches power to 
remove or punish judges would be, and uncontested retention elections 
are less of a threat to judicial independence than contested partisan 
elections.58 
                                                          
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3006 (Supp. 2016) (providing that court of appeals judges must stand for 
retention in the first regular election following their appointment and every four years after that).  
This sort of retention election is generally associated with the use of nominating commissions to 
select judges.  See generally G. Alan Tarr, Do Retention Elections Work?, 74 MO. L. REV. 605 
(2009) (arguing, inter alia, that nonpartisan retention elections have not eliminated politicization of 
judicial elections).  For further discussion of nominating commissions, see infra notes 63–80 and 
accompanying text. 
 53.   See supra note 28. 
 54.   S.B. 439, 2016 Leg. Sess. § 1 (Kan. 2016) (as amended by the Senate Committee of the 
Whole), http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2016/b2015_16/measures/documents/sb439_02_0000.pdf.  
 55.   KAN. CONST. art. 2, § 28. 
 56.   S.B. 439, supra note 54, § 1(h). 
 57.   See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing proposals targeting the courts). 
 58.   Partisan elections are a problem because judges must campaign and because those 
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Indeed, although retention elections rarely result in the ouster of 
sitting judges, when they do it is usually in reaction to controversial 
decisions.59  Given this reality, we cannot discount the very real 
possibility that the prospect of adverse public reactions to unpopular 
decisions might influence a judge with a pending retention election.  
Indeed, it is precisely when public sentiment runs high and may lead to 
retaliation by voters in a retention election that the need for judicial 
independence is at its greatest. 
For these reasons, I was relieved that voters voted to retain all of the 
Kansas judges who were on the ballot in the November 2016 elections, 
including not only the four liberal justices targeted by conservative 
groups because of their decisions, but also Justice Stegall, who was not.60  
I want to emphasize that I take this position not because I oppose the 
conservative agenda, but rather because I want the courts to remain 
independent.  I would take the same position in a “blue” state in which 
liberal or progressive groups targeted conservative justices because of 
unpopular decisions protecting gun rights, property owners, or religious 
exemptions for individuals who oppose same-sex marriage. 
The results of the elections provide some assurance that the state’s 
Supreme Court justices do not risk losing their positions based on 
unpopular decisions.  This is not to say that the threat of being targeted 
for non-retention is trivial.  Such a campaign forces judges (or their 
surrogates) to defend themselves at potentially great cost in terms of 
time, effort, and resources, and it may ultimately reduce the margin of 
safety.  While sitting judges typically receive an excess of 70% of the 
vote in a retention election,61 the margin of retention for the targeted 
justices was much narrower, as each received roughly 55% to 56% of the 
vote in favor of retention.62  Nonetheless, given the totality of the 
                                                          
campaigns cost money.  Seeking and accepting such contributions creates the appearance, if not the 
reality, that judges will be beholden to their contributors.  
 59.   See, e.g., A. G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html (discussing 
successful campaign in retention election to oust Iowa Supreme Court justices who voted in favor of 
recognizing a right to same-sex marriage). 
 60.   2016 General Election Results, supra note 3, at 12; Christina A. Cassidy, Control of State 
Courts Becomes a Top Political Battleground, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 3, 2016), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/0b62b60670b148ab9611a5a8b58cb48f/control-state-courts-becomes-
top-political-battleground (“Groups supportive of Republican Gov. Sam Brownback and the GOP-
controlled Legislature will be looking to oust four of the five justices up for retention elections in 
November, enabling Brownback to select their replacements to the seven-member court.”). 
 61.   Tarr, supra note 52, at 627 (“Retention races are rarely close: the mean yearly average 
positive vote has ranged from a low of sixty-nine percent in 1990 to a high of eighty-five percent in 
1964 and has not fallen below seventy-five percent over the last decade.”). 
 62.   2016 General Election Results, supra note 3, at 12.  Justice Stegall, who is widely 
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circumstances, if non-retention efforts failed in this election cycle, it 
seems unlikely that justices in Kansas need fear non-retention in any but 
the most extreme case. 
In the absence of direct oversight authority or the ability to remove 
or otherwise punish judges for unpopular decisions, the battle for control 
over the judiciary typically focuses on judicial appointments.  Although 
judicial appointments certainly influence the direction of the courts, they 
do not represent the same challenge to judicial independence.  Ideology, 
political affiliations, and past judicial actions may give some indication 
of a prospective judge’s likely jurisprudence, but there are many 
examples of appointments that did not pan out as expected.  Critically, 
moreover, once judges are appointed the bench, there is little or nothing 
that can be done to “discipline” them if they do not decide cases as 
expected.  Nonetheless, judicial appointments do have important 
implications for judicial independence and the rule of law. 
In Kansas, the means of appointing judges has been the focus of 
considerable debate.  The federal model requires nomination by the 
President that is subject to Senate confirmation,63 and some states follow 
this model.64  Most states, however, use either elections or nominating 
commissions to select judges.65  Nominating commissions, which 
typically include a special role for members of the bar, forward a list of 
(typically three) nominees, from which the Governor chooses one.  This 
method of selection—referred to as “merit selection” or the “Missouri 
plan”—usually incorporates uncontested retention elections to provide a 
measure of democratic accountability.66  Its supporters argue that it 
                                                          
regarded as conservative and was not targeted, see supra note 2, received the more typical retention 
margin of about 71 percent of the vote.  2016 General Election Results, supra note 3, at 12.  This 
differential suggests that at least 15 percent (71–56%) of voters responded to the political campaign 
to oust those four justices.  See id.  Without more data, it is impossible to know whether the 
remaining votes represent voters who voted to oust (29–30%) or retain (55–56%) all the justices, or 
whether some ideologically based votes for and against liberal and conservative justices cancelled 
each other out. 
 63.   Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SUP. CT., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi1 (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
 64.   Examples include Maine and New Jersey.  See ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 8; N.J. CONST. 
art. VI, § VI, ¶ 1.  There are, however, many variations, and some states use both nominating 
commissions and legislative approval for the governor’s appointments, while others require approval 
by some other designated body.  See generally Stephen J. Ware, Selection to the Kansas Supreme 
Court, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 386, 388–91 (2008). 
 65.   See generally Rachel Paine Caufield, The Evolving Patchwork of Judicial Selection in the 
United States, 53 ADVOCATE 85, 90–94 (2010) (providing a breakdown of appointment methods in 
the states); Ware, supra note 64, at 386–91 (same). 
 66.   Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751, 758–64 
(2009). 
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results in the selection of judges based on merit and that it avoids the 
risks associated with partisan judicial elections. 
Until recently, Kansas used nominating commissions to select 
Supreme Court justices, court of appeals judges, and some lower court 
judges, although individual judicial districts could opt for judicial 
elections for district court judges instead.  With increasing tensions 
between conservatives and the court, changing the method of selecting 
judges became an important objective for conservatives and Republicans 
in the state.  As noted above, the legislature adopted a statute shifting to 
the federal model for appointment of court of appeals judges, but 
advocates fell short of the needed votes for a constitutional amendment 
to change the means of selecting Kansas Supreme Court justices.67  
Insofar as the Kansas Supreme Court is the court of last resort and has 
the final say on matters of Kansas law, the failure to change the means of 
selecting Supreme Court justices is probably more significant than the 
change in the means of selecting court of appeals judges. 
The essential argument against the use of nominating commissions is 
that they are elitist and tend to skew judicial policy to the left (because 
they are most common in conservative states and the bar as a whole is 
more liberal than the general population).68  Thus, the argument 
continues, because judges inevitably make policy when they develop 
common law principles, interpret statutes, and apply constitutional 
provisions, the selection process should represent the people, at least 
indirectly, and should not give disproportionate power to the bar.69  My 
friend and colleague Steve Ware has been a leading advocate of this 
position.70  While we have had many discussions of the subject and I 
                                                          
 67.   See supra note 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 68.   See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr., The Perils of Merit Selection, 46 IND. L. REV. 87, 99 (2013) (“A 
disconnect between the ideological preferences of the People and the commission is thus inevitable 
given that lawyers, as a group, are more liberal than the general public . . . .”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, 
The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675, 690 (2009) (“[M]any people believe that 
lawyers are, on average, more liberal than are the members of the general public.”). 
 69.   See, e.g., Nelson Lund, May Lawyers Be Given the Power to Elect Those Who Choose Our 
Judges? “Merit Selection” and Constitutional Law, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1043, 1046–47 
(2011) (arguing this approach violates equal protection). 
 70.   See generally Stephen J. Ware, Originalism, Balanced Legal Realism and Judicial 
Selection: A Case Study, 22 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165 (2013); Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri 
Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751 (2009); Stephen J. Ware, The Bar’s 
Extraordinarily Powerful Role in Selecting the Kansas Supreme Court, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
392 (2009); Stephen J. Ware, Selection to the Kansas Supreme Court, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
386 (2008).  See also Stephen J. Ware, Judicial Elections, Judicial Impartiality and Legitimate 
Judicial Lawmaking: Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 59 (2015) 
(discussing implications of campaign finance in judicial elections for judicial decisions). 
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recognize the principled arguments in support of the federal model, this 
is a topic on which we disagree.71 
I think the argument for a representative judicial selection process 
rests on a false premise.  Unlike legislators, elected officials in the 
executive branch, or even political appointments, judges do not represent 
people or constituencies.72  They represent the law.  The proper measure 
of a means of judicial appointment is the extent to which such a method 
is likely to result in the appointment of judges who seek to properly 
interpret and apply the law, not the extent to which the inevitable policy 
choices implicit in such decisions align with the policy preferences of 
voters in the state.  In my view, the fact that judges must make policy is a 
reason to minimize the extent to which their ideology drives their 
decision making, rather than an argument in favor of placing their 
appointment in the hands of partisan politicians. 
To develop this point, we may consider the factors that motivate 
judicial decisions.73  Judges do not stand to gain directly from their 
decisions, and the usual financial and career incentives that motivate 
people in the work environment do not apply.  Judges do not get fired, 
merit raises and bonuses are off the table, and promotion to a higher 
court is rare.  Under these conditions, judges are motivated or 
incentivized by other factors, including craft norms and ideological 
consumption.74 
                                                          
 71.   I note here that adopting the federal model (or using nominating commissions) may be 
defended on the basis of principle or as a matter of political expediency.  For the principled 
advocate, it is immaterial whether changing the means of selection would result in judges whose 
decisions are more conservative or liberal.  Supporters who advocate for such a means of selection 
because it is likely to produce a more conservative or liberal bench (and would not do so if the result 
were different) do so as a matter of political expediency.  In practice, of course, it may be hard to tell 
the difference, and some readers will be skeptical of my own effort to analyze these matters 
independently of their political implications. 
 72.   For this reason, the selection of judges is different from the selection of political officials.  
In the latter case, application of the one-person, one-vote principle might be appropriate.  See 
Richard E. Levy, Written Testimony of Richard E. Levy Before the House Agriculture Committee, 
State of Kansas, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 265, 282 n.118 (1994) (suggesting that the use of a nominating 
commission with disproportionate representation of agricultural interests to nominate candidates for 
the position of Secretary of Agriculture might violate the one-person, one-vote principle).  Several 
federal courts of appeals have therefore rejected constitutional challenges to the use of nominating 
commissions, including the Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission.  See Dool v. Burke, 
497 Fed. App’x 782, 784 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished opinion); Carlson v. Wiggins, 675 F.3d 
1134, 1140–42 (8th Cir. 2012); Kirk v. Carpeneti, 623 F.3d 889, 896–900 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 73.   This discussion draws upon a model of judicial behavior that I developed with Sid Shapiro 
a number of years ago.  See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and 
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1052–79 
(1995) (articulating model and considering its implications for the scope of review of agency 
decisions). 
 74.   A third incentive might be minimizing the time and effort involved in judging or 
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 Craft norms refer to norms of the legal profession and the 
judiciary that demand reasoned explanations for decisions 
based on the interpretation and application of law to the facts 
of a case.75  Judges have incentives to pursue craft norms 
both for their own sake and because a reputation for craft 
enhances a judge’s prestige and influence.76 
 Ideological consumption refers to the utility derived from 
influencing public events in accordance with one’s 
worldview, which may be valuable because it furthers (at 
least indirectly) a judge’s self-interest,77 and because of 
principles of individual or social justice that transcend any 
identifiable self-interest. 
In practice, we may expect that all judges will value both craft norms 
and ideological consumption, and that the relative weight of these two 
considerations is not material when the results indicated by craft and 
ideology are the same.  The critical question is which value judges will 
prioritize when the two are in conflict. 
In my view, judges who value craft norms over ideological 
consumption better serve judicial independence and the rule of law 
because they are more likely, in any given case, to seek objectively to 
determine what the law is and apply it objectively, even if (as human 
beings) they do so imperfectly.  By contrast, ideologically motivated 
judges are more likely to read the law to further their ideological 
preferences, reject precedents with which they disagree, and thereby 
unsettle the rule of law.  More broadly, the more judges are perceived as 
political actors driven by ideology, the less likely they are to have the 
necessary legitimacy in the minds of the general public to represent the 
rule of law. 
From this perspective, how we select judges matters.  The more 
political and ideological the method of selection, the more likely it is to 
select judges who are ideologically oriented.  Thus, from the perspective 
of judicial independence and the rule of law, the worst means of 
                                                          
promoting leisure, in the sense that judges might make decisions that are the easiest to write or that 
reduce their caseloads in the future.  This incentive is not central to our model, however, and will be 
discounted.  
 75.   Shapiro & Levy, supra note 73, at 1053. 
 76.   Id. at 1055–57. 
 77.   Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1743, 1777–78 (2013).  For example, a decision benefiting property owners would, at least 
indirectly, benefit a judge who is a property owner.  To the extent that our ideologies often align 
with our self-interest, this sort of benefit may be common, even if judges do not consciously pursue 
it. 
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selecting judges is through elections—even if, once elected, they do not 
have to worry about removal or reelection.  A craft orientation is not 
conducive to running for judicial election as a Democrat or Republican, 
or even as a nonpartisan candidate whose positions must appeal to voters.  
For similar reasons, moving to the federal model would likely increase 
the ideological orientation of the state’s Supreme Court judges, as 
reflected in the experience we have had in selecting federal judges. 
The federal nomination process has been all too political and 
ideological.  As the battle over replacing Justice Scalia on the United 
States Supreme Court reflects, the President and Senators care deeply 
about the ideology of these appointments.  To be sure, both Republicans 
and Democrats are acutely aware of the ideological preferences of 
judicial nominees, and it has been increasingly difficult to appoint judges 
with extreme ideological views.  In a strongly red state or strongly blue 
state, however, there might be nothing to prevent the appointment of 
ideologically extreme or politically partisan judges, thereby undermining 
the ability or willingness of the courts to enforce the rule of law as 
against their political and ideological allies.78 
More broadly, research into the outcomes of federal judicial 
decisions shows a strong correlation between the party appointing a 
federal judge and the judge’s votes in ideologically charged decisions.79  
To me, this sort of correlation raises the concern that judicial decisions 
are the product of ideological preferences rather than the product of 
judicial craft.  To be sure, this sort of decision making is not necessarily 
a matter of a conscious choice to produce a given result at any cost.  
Nonetheless, the more a judge cares about his or her ideology, the more 
likely it is that his or her ideology will influence the outcomes of 
decisions.  Conversely, the more a judge cares about craft, the more 
likely it is that craft norms will guide the decision. 
Because I believe that the judicial method, as reflected in craft 
norms, is essential to judicial independence and the rule of law, I want 
judges who value craft.  It is the judicial method that legitimizes the 
                                                          
 78.   In such a state, moreover, control of the Senate does not change hands, and the federal 
model is unlikely to result in ideological diversity or balance on the courts.  
 79.   See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to 
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998) 
(providing statistical analysis that documents correlations between the political party of a judge’s 
appointing President and outcomes in politically charged cases, but noting that effect diminishes 
when a panel includes a judge appointed by a President from the other party); Cass R. Sunstein et al., 
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 
(2004) (providing statistical analysis that documents correlations between the political party of a 
judge’s appointing President and outcomes in politically charged cases). 
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judiciary as the neutral arbiter of legal disputes with the ultimate power 
to say what the law is, not its accountability to the electorate or the 
congruence of its ideology with the ideological preferences of the people 
of a state.  From the rule-of-law perspective then, we want judges who 
are committed to judicial craft norms, as opposed to a particular 
ideology.  On balance, I believe that using a nominating commission is 
more likely than elections or the federal model to produce that result.80 
LETTER FOUR: THE UMPIRES STRIKE BACK 
Dear Readers: 
Although the judiciary has an independent constitutional status that 
prevents direct legislative or executive control, it is necessarily 
dependent on the legislature and the executive branch for the 
effectiveness of its operations.  The courts could not function without 
legislative action to create the judicial system, to provide for civil and 
criminal actions and procedures, and to appropriate funds to support the 
operation of the courts.  Likewise, the courts are dependent upon the 
executive branch to comply with, implement, and enforce their decisions.  
The question becomes how these respective roles affect the balance of 
power when the political branches disagree with judicial decisions. 
One set of issues concern the extent to which the legislature can use 
its general authority to provide for the creation, jurisdiction, and 
operation of the courts as a means for limiting judicial power or 
punishing the courts for decisions with which it disagrees.81  Three 
examples noted above illustrate this issue: special provisions for school 
finance litigation, provisions divesting the Kansas Supreme Court of 
power to appoint chief district judges, and time limits on appellate 
                                                          
 80.   To be sure, a nominating commission is only likely to produce craft-based nominations if 
the body itself is not ideological and chooses judges based on factors related to judicial craft.  In this 
sense, how a nominating commission is comprised—who makes the appointments and what 
constituencies those appointments draw from is a major factor.  To the extent there are concerns 
about the ideological orientation of the Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission, that 
concern might warrant consideration of changing its composition or the means through which 
members are selected.  Any detailed examination of that question is beyond the scope of this essay. 
 81.   At the federal level, for example, there is a longstanding but unresolved debate over the 
extent to which Congress may divest the federal courts of jurisdiction over cases and controversies.  
Compare Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953) (arguing that Congress may not limit 
jurisdiction so as to destroy the essential function of the courts), with Herbert Wechsler, The Courts 
and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965) (arguing that Congress has the authority to 
decide the extent to which federal courts would be used).  See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 155–86 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing various 
aspects of the debate). 
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decisions.  Each of these measures limits the courts and some of them 
seem to be motivated at least in part as retaliation against the courts for 
their decisions.  None of these measures, however, has deterred the 
Kansas courts, which have avoided or invalidated each of them. 
First, the Kansas Legislature enacted special statutory provisions 
concerning school finance litigation in the wake of Montoy.  The reforms 
provided for the formation of a special three-judge panel to hear 
litigation challenging the suitability of educational funding.82  This 
provision is worth discussing briefly, even though it does not raise any 
serious constitutional issues.  Providing for the formation of a three-
judge panel does not limit the jurisdiction or powers of the courts and in 
that sense does not encroach upon judicial power.83  Conversely, there 
are sound reasons, in keeping with the appropriate legislative regulation 
of the judicial system, for assigning cases this important to a three-judge 
panel rather than to a single judge.84  Thus, a three-judge panel appointed 
under this statute tried the Gannon case without any objection.85 
Another part of this reform, however, prohibits Kansas courts from 
closing schools or enjoining funding for schools as a remedy for a 
constitutional violation.86  This prohibition raises more serious 
                                                          
 82.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-64b03(a)–(b) (Supp. 2016) (directing that, after notification that a 
civil action “alleging a violation of article 6 of the Kansas constitution” had been filed, the chief 
judge of the Kansas Court of Appeals “shall appoint a panel of three current or retired district court 
judges to preside over such civil action”). 
 83.   If the legislators thought that a three-judge panel would be more receptive to the 
legislature’s position or reluctant to find that the legislature had failed to fulfill its constitutional duty 
to fund schools adequately, Gannon suggests that was a mistake.  The three-judge panel issued two 
decisions, both of which were highly critical of the legislature and both of which found 
constitutional violations that required substantial additional funding.  The first decision of the three-
judge panel in Gannon v. State in 2013 made numerous findings against the state and required 
substantial additional funding to be provided.  No. 10C1569, 2013 WL 146092, at *88–89 (Kan. 
Dist. Ct. Jan. 10, 2013).  That decision was reversed in part by the Kansas Supreme Court, which 
clarified the standards for determining the adequacy of funding and remanded to the panel for 
reconsideration in light of those standards.  See Gannon v. State (Gannon I), 319 P.3d 1196, 1216–
24 (Kan. 2014).  After remand, the panel reaffirmed its original conclusion that the legislature had 
failed to provide adequate funding.  See Gannon v. State, No. 2010CV1569, SHAWNEE CT. (Kan. 
Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.shawneecourt.org/DocumentCenter/View/527. 
 84.   Indeed, for many years, federal law provided for certain categories of cases to be tried 
before three-judge district court panels.  See generally Leland C. Nielsen, Three-Judge Courts: A 
Comprehensive Study, 66 F.R.D. 495 (1975) (discussing the use of three-judge panels in the federal 
court system).  
 85.   See Gannon, 2013 WL 146092, at *1. 
 86.   There are two virtually identical statutory provisions: one for the three-judge panel and 
one for appellate courts.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-64b03(d) (Supp. 2016) (“As a part of a remedy, 
preliminary decision or final decision in which a statute . . . has been held unconstitutional as a 
violation of article 6 of the Kansas constitution, the judicial panel . . . shall not have the authority to 
order a school district . . . to be closed or enjoin the use of all statutes related to the distribution of 
funds for public education.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2106(d) (Supp. 2016) (“As a part of a remedy, 
 
2017 THE WAR OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 747 
constitutional questions because it purports to limit the courts’ remedial 
authority and thereby may encroach on their authority in a manner that 
violates separation of powers.  It is important to bear in mind that it was 
the threat of closing the schools that ultimately forced the legislature to 
provide funding in Montoy.87  Prohibiting this remedy was thus an 
obvious effort to deprive the courts of their most powerful tool to ensure 
compliance with school finance orders.  The plaintiffs in Gannon argued 
that the prohibition was unconstitutional, but the three-judge panel 
avoided the question, concluding that the issue was not ripe because 
there was a better remedy available.88 
The Kansas Supreme Court also has avoided addressing the 
constitutionality of this prohibition, but it has sent signals suggesting that 
it will not accept such a limit on its powers.  Given the court’s resolution 
of the first appeal in Gannon, which entailed a remand to the panel for 
further findings, it was unnecessary to address any remedial issues.89  
The appeal after remand was bifurcated into an equity and an adequacy 
component, and the equity component was further along in the process 
because there was no need for new findings after remand on that issue.  
In Gannon v. State (Gannon II), the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the 
panel’s finding that the failure to fully fund state equalization aid (which 
compensated for differentials in local tax bases) violated the requirement 
of equity in school finance.90  Because the court ultimately chose not to 
impose a remedy—giving the legislature a chance to correct the 
deficiency first—it was again unnecessary for the court to determine the 
validity of the provisions limiting the courts’ remedial authority in school 
finance cases.91 
Nonetheless, after determining that the legislature had failed to meet 
its constitutional duty to provide equitable funding for schools, the 
Kansas Supreme Court engaged in a lengthy explanation of the courts’ 
duty to enforce the constitution as superior law and their corresponding 
                                                          
preliminary decision or final decision in which a statute . . . has been held unconstitutional as a 
violation of article 6 of the Kansas constitution, the appellate court . . . shall not have the authority to 
order a school district . . . district to be closed or enjoin the use of all statutes related to the 
distribution of funds for public education.”). 
 87.   See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text. 
 88.   Gannon, 2013 WL 146092, at *80.  The panel instead issued an injunction directing the 
state to comply with the school finance laws already on the books.  Id. at *87–88. 
 89.   Gannon v. State (Gannon I), 319 P.3d 1196, 1251 (“Because we are reversing and 
remanding, which may eventually make the remedy issues moot, we reach no decision on any 
particular arguments in the remedy context.”). 
 90.   368 P.3d 1024, 1060–62 (Kan. 2016). 
 91.   Id.  
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power to impose remedies for constitutional violations.92  And the court 
left little doubt what the remedy would be if the legislature failed to meet 
its constitutional obligations: “Without a constitutionally equitable 
school finance system, the schools in Kansas will be unable to operate 
beyond June 30.  And because an unconstitutional system is invalid, 
efforts to implement it can be enjoined.”93  It is striking that the court in 
Gannon II did not cite or discuss the statutory provisions purporting to 
prohibit this remedy (at least I did not discover any such reference), 
suggesting that the court regarded them as null and void.94 
Second, the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the statutory 
provisions divesting it of authority to appoint chief judges in each 
district, notwithstanding the legislature’s actions to link that provision to 
the judiciary’s budget.  Traditionally, the appointment of chief judges of 
the district courts had been the responsibility of the Kansas Supreme 
Court, consistent with its administrative responsibility for the judicial 
system under the Kansas Constitution.95  In the 2014 session, however, 
the legislature added a provision to the appropriations bill for the 
judiciary amending chapter 20, section 329 of the Kansas Statutes 
Annotated to specify that “[i]n every judicial district, the district court 
judges in such judicial district shall elect a district judge as chief 
judge . . . .”96  Although there might have been some policy justifications 
                                                          
 92.   Id. at 1056–60. 
 93.   Id. at 1062 (“[T]he legislature’s chosen path during the 2016 session will ultimately 
determine whether Kansas students will be treated fairly and the schoolhouse doors will be open to 
them in August for the beginning of the 2016–2017 school year.”); see also Gannon v. State 
(Gannon IV), No. 113,267, 2017 WL 833551, at *41(Kan. Mar. 2, 2017) (“[I]f by June 30, 2017, the 
State has not satisfactorily demonstrated to this court that any K–12 public education financing 
system the legislature enacts is capable of meeting the adequacy requirements of Article 6, then a 
lifting of the stay of today’s mandate will mean that the state’s education financing system is 
constitutionally invalid and therefore void.”). 
 94.   The legislative response to the equity portion of the litigation during the 2016 legislative 
session did not entirely satisfy the court, which nonetheless delayed imposing any remedial order so 
as to give the legislature an opportunity to comply.  See Gannon v. State (Gannon III), 372 P.3d 
1181, 1204 (Kan. 2016).  A special legislative session resulted in corrective legislation, and the 
parties subsequently stipulated as to legislative compliance.  See Joint Stipulation of Constitutionally 
Equitable Compliance, Gannon v. State, No. 15-113,267-S, KAN. CTS. 2 (Kan. June 27, 2016), 
http://www.kscourts.org/kansas-courts/supreme-
court/Cases_of_interest/Cases/113267/JointStipulationConstitutionallyEquitbleCompliance.pdf. The 
adequacy portion of the case, however, may test the limits of the courts’ remedial authority. 
 95.   See KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (“The supreme court shall have general administrative 
authority over all courts in this state.”).  The power to appoint chief judges was originally asserted 
by Supreme Court Rule, which was later codified into statute.  See Solomon v. State, 364 P.3d 536, 
540–41 (Kan. 2015). 
 96.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-329 (Supp. 2016); S. Substitute for H.B. 2338, 2014 Leg. Sess. § 
11 (Kan. 2014), 
http://kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/measures/documents/hb2338_enrolled.pdf.  
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for this amendment, none were evident and the measure was widely 
perceived as a rebuke of the Kansas Supreme Court, which was the focus 
of considerable legislative ire at the time. 
Standing alone, this sort of measure does not represent a substantial 
threat to the decisional independence of the judiciary, regardless of its 
impact on judicial administration.97  But the legislature sought to protect 
the amendment against any constitutional challenge by incorporating a 
non-severability clause into the law.  This clause specified that “[i]f any 
provision of this act is stayed or is held to be invalid or unconstitutional, 
it shall be presumed conclusively that the legislature would not have 
enacted the remainder of such act without such stayed, invalid or 
unconstitutional provision.”98  In other words, if the courts stuck down 
the provision divesting the Kansas Supreme Court of authority to appoint 
the chief judge of each district, then the entire appropriation for the 
judiciary would be invalid. 
In practice, then, the non-severability clause threatened the judiciary 
with a loss of funding if it did not uphold the legislature’s attempt to 
divest the Kansas Supreme Court of this administrative authority.99  The 
constitutionality of this sort of threat is open to doubt, and one option for 
the courts might have been to invalidate it100 or to conclude that it was 
not controlling.101  That sort of funding condition, if valid, is a severe 
threat to judicial independence, and could be in an effort to insulate 
                                                          
 97.   It focuses on a relatively minor aspect of the administration of the courts, because being 
named the chief judge of a district does not bring with it a lot of power.  Moreover, it leaves control 
over this matter within the judiciary itself.  Nonetheless, government officials often care deeply 
about preserving and/or expanding their institutional authority, so stripping the supreme court of this 
sort of administrative power may be an effective form of punishment for unpopular decisions.  
 98.   S. Substitute for H.B. 2338 § 43.  A similar provision was added to the judicial 
appropriations bill adopted in 2015, which took the unusual step of treating the provision in the 2014 
legislation as not severable from the subsequent year’s budget.  See H.B. 2005, 2015 Leg. Sess. § 29 
(Kan. 2015), http://kslegislature.org/li_2016/b2015_16/measures/documents/hb2005_enrolled.pdf 
(“Except as provided further, the provisions of this act are not severable, nor are they severable from 
the provisions of 2014 Senate Substitute for House Bill No. 2338, chapter 82 of the 2014 Session 
Laws of Kansas.”). 
 99.   See generally Russell Berman, The Court Case That Could Shut Down Kansas’s Courts, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 5, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/the-court-case-that-
could-shut-down-kansass-courts/403957/.  
 100.   See Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 980 (Pa. 2006) (holding that a non-severability 
clause inserted into bill providing for judicial compensation was invalid because “enforcement of the 
clause would intrude upon the independence of the Judiciary and impair the judicial function”). 
 101.   See e.g., Gannon v. State (Gannon III), 372 P.3d 1181, 1198–1203 (Kan. 2016) (discussing 
why the court chose to disregard a statute’s severability clause).  Courts often invalidate statutes 
based on one invalid provision notwithstanding severability clauses, which legislatures typically 
insert as boilerplate language.  See id. at 1200.  Instead, courts exercise their independent judgment 
to determine the ultimate question—whether the legislation would have passed without the invalid 
provision.  See id. at 1201–03.  
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virtually any legislative action from a constitutional challenge.  The 
Kansas Supreme Court, however, did not blink. 
In Solomon v. State, the Kansas Supreme Court held that chapter 20, 
section 329 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated violated separation of 
powers by infringing upon the power to administer the courts, which 
Article 3, section 1 vests in the Kansas Supreme Court.102  The court 
focused on the purpose of this constitutional provision, adopted in 1972, 
which was to establish “clear lines of responsibility and authority in the 
administration of district courts ultimately leading back to the Supreme 
Court.”103  The court then concluded that the statute violated the well-
established four-part separation of powers test under which courts 
consider: “(1) the essential nature of the power being exercised; (2) the 
degree of control by one branch over another; (3) the objective sought to 
be attained; and (4) the practical result of blending powers as shown by 
actual experience over a period of time.”104 
The court thus invalidated the law notwithstanding the apparent 
impact of that decision on the judiciary’s budget, but it did not address 
the validity of the non-severability clause.  Instead, the court observed: 
[W]e note that the district court relied on sec. 43 of H.B. 2338, a 
nonseverability clause, to strike the legislation in its entirety.  Neither 
party has challenged the validity of that portion of the district court 
ruling, and we accordingly do not address it here.  We note only that 
our holding appears to have practical adverse consequences to the 
                                                          
 102.   See 364 P.3d 536, 544, 549–50 (Kan. 2015).  It is interesting to note that Justice Stegall 
also thought that this provision was unconstitutional, although he disagreed with the majority’s 
reasoning.  Id. at 550–57 (Stegall, J., concurring).  Justice Stegall advocated instead for a return to 
the approach articulated in State ex rel. Godard v. Johnson, which stated, “the functions of the three 
departments should be kept as distinct and separate as possible.” Id. at 556 (quoting State ex rel. 
Godard v. Johnson, 60 P. 1068, 1072 (Kan. 1900)).  Under this approach, when “the Government is 
called upon to perform a function that requires an exercise of legislative, executive, or judicial 
power, only the vested recipient of that power can perform it.”  Id. (quoting Dep’t of Transp. v. 
Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1241 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 103.   Id. at 544 (majority opinion). 
 104.   Id. at 546 (citing, inter alia, Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1122 (Kan. 2012)).  
Applying these factors, the court reasoned that the provision was unconstitutional.  See id. at 546–
48.  First, the selection and supervision of chief judges was, by its essential nature, a judicial 
function.  Id. at 546–47.  Second, “[t]he intervention by the legislature in 2014 would result in 
removal from the Supreme Court of an essential component of its constitutionally mandated 
administrative authority.”  Id. at 547.  The third factor, which the court described as “the least 
important” (because a good purpose would not save an otherwise invalid law), also cut against the 
validity of the amendment because the stated goal of promoting local control over each district was 
directly contrary to the purposes of the 1972 constitutional amendment.  Id. (internal quotations 
omitted).  Finally, the fourth factor was difficult to apply because there was no experience in Kansas 
with this method of selecting the chief judges of judicial districts.  Id.  
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judiciary budget, which the legislature may wish to address, even 
though those concerns played no part in our analysis.105 
Rather than provoking a direct confrontation by invalidating or 
ignoring the non-severability clause, the Supreme Court accepted it 
(without resolving its validity).  This result forced the legislature to 
decide whether it really wanted to defund the courts, which serve a 
variety of essential public functions.  Whatever the legislature’s 
dissatisfaction with particular decisions might be, defunding the courts 
would have had profound negative consequences for the state and was 
never really a viable option.  Accordingly, the legislature acted promptly 
to restore judicial funding after the Solomon decision.106 
A final, less high-profile example of legislative action targeting the 
courts was a statutory provision imposing deadlines for the issuance of 
judicial decisions.  Under chapter 20, section 3301 of the Kansas Statutes 
Annotated, if a court fails to issue a decision within a specified statutory 
deadline, counsel for all parties must submit a joint request to the court 
for a decision without further delay, at which point the court must either 
issue a decision within 30 days or advise the parties of the date on which 
the decision will be issued.107  While delays in issuing decisions are 
frustrating for parties, may deny or defer restorative justice to injured 
persons, and should be minimized if possible, the imposition of statutory 
deadlines arguably interferes with the judicial decision-making process. 
In State v. Buser, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the statute 
violated separation of powers.108  The case came before the court in an 
unusual procedural posture, as attorneys in a pending case sought a 
judicial order relieving them of the obligation to file a request pursuant to 
the statute, arguing it would violate their professional obligations as 
attorneys to file such a plainly unconstitutional request.109  The Kansas 
Supreme Court agreed, relying on State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 
which had held that the Attorney General was not required to comply 
with a statutory directive to file a lawsuit seeking an advisory opinion, 
                                                          
 105.   Id. at 550. 
 106.   See, e.g., Jonathan Shorman, Kansas Lawmakers Send Judicial Funding Fix to Governor, 
TOPEKA CAP.-J., http://cjonline.com/news/2016-01-28/kansas-lawmakers-send-judicial-funding-fix-
governor (last updated Jan. 29, 2016). 
 107.   Under this statute, which was adopted in the 2014 legislative session, trial judges would 
have 120 days to render a decision upon submission of a matter, and both the Kansas Court of 
Appeals and the Kansas Supreme Court were required to file a decision within 180 days.  KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 20-3301 (Supp. 2016), invalidated by State v. Buser, 302 Kan. 1, 14, 2015 WL 
4646663, at *10 (2015). 
 108.   Buser, 302 Kan. at 14, 2015 WL 4646663, at *10. 
 109.   Id. at 3, 2015 WL 4646663, at *2. 
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which he regarded as a clear violation of separation of powers.110  
Applying the four-factor test from Miller v. Johnson,111 the court 
concluded that the provision at issue in Buser encroached upon the 
judicial power in violation of separation-of-powers principles.112 
While the courts have rebuffed these legislative challenges to their 
power and discretion, at least for the time being, the extent to which they 
can rely on the political branches to comply with and enforce 
controversial orders remains an open question in the present political 
climate.  Ultimately, the courts are without power to enforce their own 
orders and there may be little that they can do if both the legislature and 
the executive branch choose to defy their decisions.  In such a case, only 
public support for the rule of law could force their hands. 
LETTER FIVE: BACK TO SCHOOLS 
Dear Readers: 
As noted in my last letter, the ultimate test for judicial independence 
and the rule of law may be whether the political branches comply with 
and enforce judicial orders with which they disagree.  This has been a 
particular issue in the context of school finance litigation, as judicial 
decisions in Kansas and in other states finding that school funding is 
constitutionally inadequate have often faced legislative delays, 
resistance, and noncompliance.113  The particular difficulty for the courts 
                                                          
 110.   Id. at 14, 2015 WL 4646663, at *10 (“Subsections (c)(1), (2), and (3) violate the separation 
of powers doctrine under the rationale expressed in Sebelius . . . .”); State ex rel. Morrison v. 
Sebelius, 179 P.3d 366, 392–93 (Kan. 2008). 
 111.   See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 112.   See Buser, 302 Kan. at 6–14, 2015 WL 4646663, at *5–10 (analyzing the statutory 
deadline and the mandatory attorney request requirement separately).  First, “[t]he power to 
determine when a court renders its decisions is essential to the basic judicial power ‘to hear, consider 
and determine controversies between rival litigants.’”  Id. at 8, 2015 WL 4646663, at *6 (quoting 
Sebelius, 179 P.3d 366, 382 (Kan. 2008) (citations omitted)).  Second, both the thirty-day deadline 
and the requirement to set a date for issuance of the opinion involved excessive control by the 
legislature over the judiciary.  Id. at 10–13, 2015 WL 4646663, at *7–9.  This conclusion was 
relatively straightforward respecting the mandatory thirty-day deadline.  Id. at 8–9, 2015 WL 
4646663, at *6–7.  The conclusion was more complicated as to the second option, which left the date 
up to the court, but this requirement nonetheless imposed a mandatory requirement that interfered 
with the courts’ ability to take the time needed to render a sound decision.  Id. at 10–13, 2015 WL 
4646663, at *8–9 (analyzing the first and second Miller factors together).  As to the third factor, the 
legislature’s goal of ensuring prompt judicial resolution of cases was laudable, and one shared by the 
court, but it could not be achieved through means that violated the separation of powers.  Id. at 9–10, 
2015 WL 4646663, at *7 (statutory deadline); id. at 13, 2015 WL 4646663, at *9 (attorney request).  
Finally, because the statute was a novel one, there was no practical experience to draw on and the 
fourth factor was indeterminate.  Id. at 10, 2015 WL 4646663, at *7 (statutory deadline); id. at 13, 
2015 WL 4646663, at *10  (attorney request). 
 113.   See Gunfight at the K-12 Corral, supra note 18, at 1078–93 (discussing remedial issues in 
 
2017 THE WAR OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 753 
in this context is that the remedy for a constitutional violation is to 
provide more money for schools. 
It is, of course, true that raising revenue, appropriating funds, and 
establishing the state’s budget are matters for the legislature.  But the 
Constitution limits the legislature’s powers in these areas in various 
ways, including a balanced budget requirement.114  Insofar as the 
Constitution is the superior law, limitations on the legislature’s fiscal 
powers are binding and the rule of law contemplates that they are 
judicially enforceable.  Like the balanced budget requirement, the people 
of the state of Kansas adopted Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution, 
which specifies that the legislature “shall provide for intellectual, 
educational, vocational and scientific improvement by establishing and 
maintaining public schools” and that it “shall make suitable provision for 
finance of the educational interests of the state.”115  These provisions 
establish a constitutional budget priority for funding the schools that 
overrides political considerations. 
On March 2, 2017, while this essay was in process, the Kansas 
Supreme Court issued its latest ruling in Gannon v. State (Gannon IV).116  
As expected, the court affirmed the panel’s conclusion that the 
legislature had failed to provide adequate funding for the schools.117  
Nonetheless, the court acceded to the state’s request to “issue a 
declaratory judgment with guidance for the Legislature while at the same 
time allowing the Legislature both the flexibility and an opportunity to 
revise the school finance system.”118  In so doing, the court set a deadline 
for legislative action: June 30, 2017.119  We are, in a sense, back where 
we started. 
                                                          
school finance cases). 
 114.   See KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 4 (“The legislature shall provide, at each regular session, for 
raising sufficient revenue to defray the current expenses of the state for two years.”); see also id. at 
§§ 6–7 (limiting indebtedness). 
 115.   KAN. CONST. art. 6, §§ 1, 6(b). 
 116.   No. 113,267, 2017 WL 833551 (Kan. Mar. 2, 2017). 
 117.   Id. at *24–39 (concluding that the structure and implementation of current school finance 
laws violated Article 6 based on a review of both inputs and educational outcomes). 
 118.   Id. at *40. 
 119.   Id. at *41 (“So if by June 30, 2017, the State has not satisfactorily demonstrated to this 
court that any K–12 public education financing system the legislature enacts is capable of meeting 
the adequacy requirements of Article 6, then a lifting of the stay of today’s mandate will mean that 
the state’s education financing system is constitutionally invalid and therefore void.”) (citations 
omitted).  The court did not specify a dollar amount that would be needed to comply, but estimates 
place the figure at somewhere between $500 and $800 million dollars.  See Bryan Lowry, Hunter 
Woodall, & Katy Bergen, Kansas Supreme Court Rules the State Has Failed to Ensure Adequate 
Education Funding, KAN. CITY STAR (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-
government/article135949108.html (noting that “John Robb, an attorney for the plaintiff districts, 
 
754 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
It is unclear what the legislative response to the court’s decision will 
be.  Initial legislative reactions have been “muted,” with few expressions 
of outrage or calls for defiance.120  This response, which contrasts with 
the outcry during the last round of school finance litigation, may be 
attributable to several factors.  Legislators apparently appreciated the 
court’s willingness to give the legislature a chance to remedy the 
deficiency and the court’s decision not to specify a dollar amount needed 
to satisfy its mandate.121  Another factor may be that the ruling was 
expected; legislators have long anticipated the need to come up with 
additional money for schools.  But I think the results of the retention 
election are also significant.  The rejection of efforts to unseat the four 
targeted justices represents, in effect, a public endorsement of the court’s 
role in enforcing Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution. 
Nonetheless, the potential for renewed conflict between the political 
branches and the court over school finance remains high.122  Given the 
state’s current budgetary shortfalls, it will not be easy to come up with 
the necessary additional funds.123  As of this writing, the legislature has 
                                                          
pegged the cost of doing this at roughly $800 million,” while “Dale Dennis, the director of school 
finance for the Kansas Department of Education, said that the cost would be closer to $535 
million”).  These estimates are consistent with those that surfaced after the panel decision.  See Dion 
Lefler & Bryan Lowry, District Court Panel: School Funding Inadequate Under Kansas 
Constitution, WICHITA EAGLE (Dec. 30, 2014), 
http://www.kansas.com/news/local/education/article5169564.html (reporting estimates that increases 
in base state aid per pupil and other funding factors would require somewhere between $548 million 
and $771 million per year). 
 120.   See Peter Hancock, School Finance Ruling Has Democrats Ecstatic; Brownback Uses It to 
Tout Need for School Choice, LAWRENCE J. WORLD (Mar. 2, 2017), 
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2017/mar/02/court-ruling-leaves-some-state-local-officials-spe/ 
(contrasting “muted” response to Gannon decision with legislative reaction to the Montoy decision).  
 121.   See id. 
 122.   In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that the court’s first adequacy decision in 
Montoy took a similar approach and the legislature did respond by appropriating additional funds.  
Matters did not come to a head until the Kansas Supreme Court rejected that effort as insufficient to 
cure the constitutional defect and made clear the magnitude of additional funding that would be 
needed.  See Gunfight at the K-12 Corral, supra note 18, at 1044–47.  One sign that compliance may 
become contentious is the legislature’s decision to hire former Senator Jeff King to advise it on 
compliance with the order. See, e.g., Celia Llopis-Jepsen, Kansas Legislature Hires Former Senator 
Jeff King as Attorney on School Funding, over Democratic Objections, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL 
(Apr. 7, 2017), http://cjonline.com/news/state-government/2017-04-07/kansas-legislature-hires-
former-senator-jeff-king-attorney-school. Although legislative leaders and Senator King insist that 
he was hired for his legal expertise rather than his political expertise, it is significant that Senator 
King has been an outspoken critic of the Kansas Supreme Court and a leading proponent of the 
block grant measure rejected by the court in Gannon IV, as well as the non-severability clause 
discussed earlier.  Id.; supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text.   
 123.   See, e.g., Hunter Woodall, Kansas Expects Budget Shortfall Around $350 Million This 
Fiscal Year, KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-
government/article114021098.html (noting recent budgetary issues that Kansas is facing).  
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not been able to come up with a plan to address existing shortfalls, much 
less find an additional half a million dollars a year (or more) for 
schools.124  Given these political realities, there is a distinct possibility 
that the legislature will not be able to agree on a response to the court’s 
decision or that the legislative response will be insufficient to satisfy the 
court.125 
If the necessary funding is not forthcoming, it is not clear what the 
court can, should, or will do in response.  Unlike most constitutional 
provisions, the judiciary cannot remedy a violation of Article 6 by 
enjoining the operation of or invalidating unconstitutional state laws.  
Curing constitutionally inadequate funding levels requires legislation 
appropriating additional funding.  State courts have tried various 
solutions to this remedial problem,126 including a recent order in 
Washington finding the state in contempt for persistent failure to correct 
deficiencies in school funding and ordering the state to pay a fine of 
$100,000 per day into an escrow account for the schools.127  One 
suspects that the Kansas Legislature would not prefer this remedy to the 
one used in Montoy and foreshadowed in Gannon II: enjoining the 
                                                          
 124.   Although the legislature passed a bill repealing many of the tax cuts enacted in 2011, see 
supra note 25 and accompanying text, Governor Brownback vetoed the bill, and there were 
insufficient votes in the Senate to override it.  Hunter Woodall & Bryan Lowry, Gov. Sam 
Brownback’s Tax Policies Survive — Barely — After Kansas Senate Vote, KAN. CITY STAR (Feb. 22, 
2017), http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article134334184.html. 
 125.   If so, the court is not likely to be sympathetic to legislative claims that the money to 
comply with a judicial order is simply not available.  See Gannon v. State (Gannon III), 372 P.3d 
1181, 1198 (Kan. 2016) (acknowledging “the political realities of the legislative branch” but 
concluding that “we must review lawmakers’ efforts for conformity with the Kansas Constitution”).  
The issue is further complicated by the need to develop a new funding formula to replace the system 
of block grants that was adopted while the appeal was pending in Gannon.  See Gannon v. State 
(Gannon II), 368 P.3d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 2016) (concluding that the block grant system was “a mere 
extension of the fiscal year 2015 funding system” that “is not a substantial shift in the way funds are 
distributed for public education” because block grants were “calculated primarily using the now-
repealed SDFQPA formula”). 
 126.   See Gunfight at the K-12 Corral, supra note 18, at 1089–93 (discussing states’ remedial 
approaches). 
 127.   McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, WASH. CTS. 8–10 (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/843627_081315McCl
earyorder.pdf.  See also Joseph O’Sullivan, Jim Brunner & Paige Cornwell, School Funding Back on 
Table as Court Fines State $100,000 a Day, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/supreme-court-orders-100000-per-day-fines-in-
mccleary-case/.  On October 6, 2016, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the state’s argument 
that legislative action had cured the constitutional deficiencies and continued the contempt sanction 
in place.  McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, WASH. CTS. 8–13 (Wash. Oct. 6, 2016), 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/843627Order100616.
pdf. 
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expenditure of funds pursuant to constitutionally invalid spending 
provisions.128 
But either remedy would depend on the executive branch to be 
effective.129  If, for example, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled the 
statutory prohibition on enjoining the expenditure of funds for schools 
invalid and issued an injunction, would the responsible officials in the 
executive branch comply with the order?  There were voices counseling 
defiance in response to the court’s orders in the Montoy litigation, 
although the legislature ultimately complied. 
I certainly hope that the conflict between the judiciary and the 
political branches does not lead to open defiance.  If it does come to that, 
the power of the courts will ultimately depend on how much the people 
of the state care about the rule of law. 
 
                                                          
 128.   As noted previously, although statutes purport to preclude the courts from enjoining school 
funding, those statutes are arguably unconstitutional and the court does not seem to be deterred by 
them.  See supra notes 86–94 and accompanying text. 
 129.   For example, it is not clear what the Washington Supreme Court could or would do if state 
officials did not pay the fine as required by its orders. 
